Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India by Roepstorff, Kristina
441
Book Review
Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010, 359 pages, ISBN 9780230242159, Price 72,99€.
For 17 years Jawaharlal Nehru served as the first prime minister of 
newly independent India. Being one of the most prominent figures in In-
dia’s history, a large number of books have been written on Jawaharlal 
Nehru’s life and his political rule. Raghavan’s War and Peace in Modern 
India falls within the second category and presents a historical study of 
Nehru’s foreign policy, “concentrating on matters most related to the 
fundamental questions of war and peace” (p.3). A former Indian army 
officer who obtained his Ph.D. from the renowned Department of War 
Studies at King’s College, London, Raghavan is indeed a very suitable 
candidate for this endeavour. Through skilful use of untapped archival 
material located both within and outside India, Raghavan reconstructs 
crucial events in the aftermath of India’s independence with the aim to 
understand Nehru’s crisis management and foreign policy strategies. 
Giftedly recreating the intellectual and political environment of the In-
dian political policy establishment at the time, Raghavan shows how 
Nehru’s key advisors helped in shaping and implementing his foreign 
policy in the wake of crises.
Focusing on the period from 1947 until 1962, Raghavan examines 
and compares seven key crisis situations Nehru faced as prime minister 
of a new state that came into being amid the bloodiest partition in his-
tory: the disputes over the accession of the princely states of Junagadh 
in 1947, Hyderabad in 1947-1948, and Kashmir both in 1947-1948 as 
well as post-1951; the refugee crisis in East and West Bengal in 1950 
and resulting tensions with Pakistan; and, finally, the border dispute 
with China from 1948-1960 and the Sino-Indian war in 1962. Criticis-
ing common accounts of these events as failing to take into account 
the particular political and historical context in which they occurred, 
Raghavan compellingly illustrates how they would have appeared at the 
time and reveals the rationale behind Nehru’s strategic choices, influ-
enced not only by ground realities but also by his own political ideology. 
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Presenting them as interlinked rather than separate events, Raghavan 
compellingly draws out the ways in which lessons learned during each 
crisis influenced the handling of subsequent ones. 
The book is divided into eight chapters and begins with a brief outline 
of Nehru’s personality and his political ideals shaped by liberal real-
ism and coupled with an aspiration to create a distinctive international 
personality for India – the latter most commonly associated with his 
non-alignment policy during the Cold War. Though being profoundly in-
fluenced by Gandhi and having been a key member of the non-violent 
movement that led India into independence, Nehru was also influenced 
by realist thinkers and their belief that the use of force was an unavoid-
able element in the relations between states. As Raghavan points out, 
in contrast to Gandhi, Nehru had an instrumental understanding of non-
violence as a limited policy and method for the achievement for certain 
ends. Yet, Nehru “constantly recoiled at the prospect of war and sought 
to minimise the possibility of escalation to full-scale hostilities” (p. 19). 
In reference to Nehru’s autobiography of 1936, Raghavan shows how 
this very mixture of liberal values and realist outlook made Nehru follow 
coercive rather than consensual or controlling strategies in his foreign 
policy. These coercive strategies were characterised by the willingness 
to use force with the purpose to build up pressure on the opponent and 
influence his range of choices and actions.
In a detailed analysis, Raghavan in the subsequent chapters outlines 
the major dilemmas Nehru faced when dealing with the evolving crises 
in the three princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Kashmir that 
had to decide their political status in the aftermath of British colonial 
rule. As Raghavan points out, the decisions of the princely states with 
their important geopolitical location were not only of high significance, 
but inherently interlinked as the response of one state would have con-
sequences on the others. Matters were complicated due to the particu-
lar political make-up and demographics of these princely states: While 
in Junagadh and Hyderabad a Muslim king ruled over a Hindu majority 
population, in Kashmir, it was the other way round. Nehru, who empha-
sised the importance of taking into account the wishes of the popula-
tion, repeatedly urged for referenda to be held in Junagadh, Hyderabad, 
and Kashmir. This was, however, not in line with either the general po-
sition of the ruling Congress party or Jinnah, who was Pakistan’s first 
Governor General at the time. The Congress favoured accession of the 
princely states to India, with powers over defence, foreign affairs and 
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communication to be held by the Centre in Delhi. Jinnah, on the other 
hand, promoted either their accession to Pakistan or full independence. 
It was within this context that Nehru had to manoeuvre for a resolution 
of the crises.  
The Junagadh crisis was the first international crisis the Indian 
government was confronted with. When Junagadh decided to accede 
to Pakistan, the Indian government responded with the deployment 
of the military at the state’s borders. However, Nehru sought to avoid 
armed confrontation and used all diplomatic channels at hand to resolve 
the crisis peacefully. When the besieged government of Junagadh in-
vited India to take over the administration, a referendum was held and 
the crises ended without an escalation into war. As Raghavan argues the 
Junagadh crisis “showcased themes that would recur” such as Nehru’s 
concerns about domestic opinion, his attention to the stance of external 
powers and international norms, and his concern of the vulnerability of 
Muslims in India (p. 64). As such, it fashioned Nehru’s stance towards 
both Hyderabad and Kashmir as well as having long-term effects on 
his approach to crisis management, which came to be characterised by 
attempts to control the situation to prevent further escalation, deploy 
the military to demonstrate resolve, and at the same time explore dip-
lomatic options to avoid full-scale armed confrontation. 
The situation in Hyderabad was somehow different. Unlike Junagadh, 
Hyderabad opted for independence, unwilling to join either India or Pa-
kistan. After unsuccessful rounds of negotiation that also involved is-
sues concerning Kashmir and Junagadh, in 1948 the Government of 
India launched Operation Polo and Hyderabad’s forces surrendered 
within five days, resulting in the merger of Hyderabad into India. De-
scribing the diplomatic negotiations between India, Pakistan, Britain, 
and Hyderabad, Raghavan finds, however, that: “The Hyderabad crisis 
demonstrated the limits to the exercise of power and the need for ever 
more circumspection” (p. 100). In light of violence against Muslims in 
the wake of India’s annexation, the Hyderabad crisis reinforced Nehru’s 
concerns about communal relations in the subcontinent. The acknowl-
edgement of the limits of the use of force and the adverse effects it 
could have on communal relations ultimately shaped Nehru’s response 
to the Bengal crisis of 1950, as elaborated later in the book. 
Though being extensively studied both by scholars as well as policy-
makers, and despite early UN involvement, the Kashmir crisis prevails 
to this date. Both now and then the Kashmir crisis involved a combina-
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tion of geopolitical and ideological interests of India as well as Pakistan. 
In 1947, Pakistani groups entered Kashmir with the aim to liberate the 
majority Muslim population from the Hindu rule. Unable to defend the 
princely state from invasion, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed the Instru-
ment of Accession to India to gain India’s military support. The situation 
escalated and resulted in the First Indo-Pakistani War that lasted until 
1948 und ended when India took the issue to the UN Security Coun-
cil. In analysing the events of 1947-1948 and post-1951, Raghavan’s 
focuses on the question to what extent the Kashmir crisis shaped Neh-
ru’s political thinking and foreign policy. He convincingly shows how 
the experience with Kashmir and the first Indo-Pakistani War reinforced 
Nehru’s preference for the limited use of force or threats of force and 
his favouring of coercive over-controlling strategies in his foreign policy. 
According to Raghavan it is this strategy that not only shaped Nehru’s 
approach towards the Bengal crisis of 1950 and Indian defence policy 
towards Kashmir post-1950s, but has become the cornerstone of India’s 
policy in relation to Kashmir ever since.
The book’s most original chapter deals with the 1950 Bengal refugee 
crisis that almost resulted in another war between India and Pakistan 
and that has largely been ignored in the literature. For Raghavan, the 
Bengal crisis is instrumental for understanding Nehru’s crisis manage-
ment strategy that combined the adherence to idealist values with a 
realist assessment and understanding of the situation. When Hindu ref-
ugees came in large numbers from then East Pakistan to West Bengal, 
communal tensions heightened. Though there was widespread domestic 
pressure on Nehru to go to war against Pakistan to protect the Hindu 
minority in East Pakistan, Nehru was convinced that the use of force 
would only intensify inter-communal tensions and would not make any 
strategic sense. As Raghavan shows, his concern about inter-communal 
relations made Nehru opt for coercive diplomacy, as previously applied 
in the case of Kashmir. 
In response to the growing communal tensions, Nehru proposed to 
the then Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan an Indo-Pak joint 
enquiry, which was however met with reluctance by Liaquat Ali Khan. 
Both back-channel diplomacy involving the British and Americans as 
well as pressure from the Indian government failed. Yet, as Raghavan 
points out, Nehru’s persistence in resisting the pressure to use force 
and his continuous diplomatic efforts for a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict ultimately resulted in the signing of the Nehru-Liaquat Pact. This 
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Pact presented an important diplomatic breakthrough and led to a de-
escalation of the situation. The successful handling of this crisis consoli-
dated Nehru’s crisis management approach – to balance domestic and 
international pressures and to combine military and diplomatic means. 
The same coercive strategy was subsequently, though less successfully, 
applied in Nehru’s handling of the border dispute with China. 
In his discussion of Nehru’s handling of the border dispute with China 
in the final chapter, Raghavan reveals Nehru’s failure in interpreting 
political developments at the international level that ultimately led to 
India’s defeat in the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Particularly, he failed to 
adequately assess the importance of the China-Soviet détente and to 
foresee Chinese course of actions in 1962. Contrasting domestic opinion 
with Nehru’s own view of international politics, Raghavan explains the 
motivation behind India’s forward policy in the North Eastern Frontier 
Areas that involved the placing of outposts along the border and the 
reasons behind India’s military defeat in 1962. Nehru’s handling of the 
China crisis, Raghavan argues, was influenced by his experiences from 
the management of previous crises. Erroneously, he believed the same 
strategy would resolve the dispute in India’s favour, without having to 
resort to the actual use of force. However, India was defeated by China 
and the crisis of 1962 led India to enhance its military capabilities and 
resulted in India’s military dominance in South Asia.
In his original analysis of Nehru’s crisis management in the after-
math of independence, Raghavan goes beyond the prevailing polaris-
ing accounts of traditionalist and revisionist scholars of Indian history. 
According to traditionalist historians, Nehru was a naive idealist whose 
policies on Kashmir and China were “flaccid and inept” (p. 2), respon-
sible for the persistence of conflict in both cases. Revisionist historians, 
on the other hand, depict him as “a mindless and arrogant hardliner” 
(p. 2) who was all too ready to use force in handling these crises. Both 
accounts criticise the lack of realism in Nehru’s foreign policy. Raghavan 
challenges these two competing accounts, arguing that it was the com-
bination of liberalism and realism that shaped Nehru’s sophisticated cri-
sis management strategy. This strategy relied heavily on the ability to 
understand the roots of each crisis, the evaluation of the interests of 
all concerned, and the options available to them. Placing it within the 
framework of strategic analysis, the author argues that the mixture “[…] 
of liberal values and realist outlook predisposed Nehru to favour coer-
cive rather than controlling strategies” (p. 19). 
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Raghavan’s attempt to theorise Nehru’s foreign policy is an important 
contribution to both the disciplines of history and international relations. 
Thereby, a conceptual framework of how actors make strategic choices 
guides the analysis throughout the book. Following a widely used clas-
sification of the various ways of exercising power in the Social Sciences, 
Raghavan distinguishes between consensual, controlling, and coercive 
strategies, whereby “[...] the difference lies in the degree of choice 
available to the adversary” (p. 6). Nehru’s liberal realism, Raghavan 
argues, made him favour coercive strategies involving threats of force 
or the limited use of force against opponents rather than consensual 
strategies not including any force or controlling strategies involving the 
overwhelming use of force. 
Unfortunately, the discussion of the conceptual framework remains 
rather short and the book lacks an in-depth discussion of the relevant 
literature in international relations and strategic studies with its het-
erogeneous body of literature and positions. In international relations 
theory, liberal realism presents a fusion of two key schools of thought, 
namely realism and idealism, and has its origins in Greek and Roman 
political thought (Drinkwater 2005). Today, liberal realism is generally 
associated with the so-called constructivist English School that follows 
the Grotian tradition to seek a middle way between power politics (real-
ism) and utopian idealist (liberalism) (Wight 1977; Bull 1977). Refer-
ence to these key concepts of international relations theory and belief 
systems behind them would have strengthened the theoretical weight 
of the book. Likewise, Raghavan’s discussion of liberal realism does 
not engage with recent scholarly debates in international relations that 
problematise assumptions about the very dichotomy of ‘liberal’ and ‘re-
alist’ traditions (Pettman 2008; Herz 1981). The same applies to his de-
termination of consensual, controlling, and coercive strategies in foreign 
policy. Considering the fundamental role of the conceptual framework 
for the analysis and findings of the book, further engagement with the 
relevant literature and justification for the use of the particular con-
ceptual framework would have been necessary. This lack of theoreti-
cal reflection is present throughout the book, which no doubt makes a 
superb use of archival sources and provides a detailed account of each 
crisis, but fails to theorise the findings accordingly. In failing to do so, 
Raghavan misses an opportunity to contribute to international relations 
theory. 
On a different level, the very selection of cases requires further jus-
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tification to avert a selection bias that distorts the research findings. For 
instance, while it is not questioned here that both the Congo and the 
Goa crises present rather different cases, their ruling out is insufficiently 
justified. Including other cases could have either supported Raghavan’s 
argument or called into question any generalisations and consistency of 
Nehru’s crisis management approach.
None of this critique, however, lessens the value of Raghavan’s book, 
which presents an excellent historical account of Nehru’s strategy and 
foreign policy in the initial years after independence. The book success-
fully illuminates the rationale behind the strategic choices that Nehru 
undertook as the first prime minister of independent India, highlighting 
his “willingness to communicate with adversaries and search for accept-
able compromises” (p. 314). By offering a brilliant account of the events 
and experiences that shaped Nehru’s strategic thinking and approach 
to crisis management, it offers a constructive contribution to the grow-
ing literature on the making of India’s foreign policy. Most importantly, 
War and Peace in Modern India calls into question the dominating and 
polarising accounts of Nehru’s foreign policy that portray him either as 
a naive idealist or ruthless realist. In a balanced and professional analy-
sis, Raghavan reconciles these extreme positions and shows how Nehru 
himself was torn between ideology and realism. In Raghavan’s view, 
what is striking is not the occurrence of crises, nor the use of force, but 
the fact that only few of them escalated into war. Thus, Raghavan em-
phasises Nehru’s achievement to avoid war without jeopardising India’s 
core interests. 
The book, with novel and thought provoking content, provides an 
important insight into the strategic thinking and crisis management 
choices that Nehru adopted in response to a number of crises that eas-
ily could have destabilised the entire region. In light of on-going crises 
in the Subcontinent and the legacies of Nehru’s foreign policy in modern 
India, the book’s original findings are of particular interest and high rel-
evance to historians and scholars and students of international relations 
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